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Volume 4, Number 12 (August 4, 1999) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Does the 'family' trust the president? 
An analysis by Obshchaya gazeta (8 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0709, via World 
News Connection) delves into the heavy-handed editing of an interview with 
President Yel'tsin, which appeared in Izvestiya on 6 July. While Obshchaya 
gazeta used the story of overt apparat intervention in and "correction" of the 
president's comments to highlight policy differences within the Kremlin, 
specifically the "family's" obsession with modifying presidential statements about 
the Communist Party, the real concern may be that there is yet further proof that 
Yel'tsin's closest advisers do not trust him to conduct capably even a short, 
coherent interview. 
 
This isn't breaking news, but it is disturbing. While an analyst is obviously 
cautious when attributing decision-making powers to shadow advisors, Yel'tsin's 
inner circle has become almost shamelessly overt in their control over the once 
independent-minded president. Yel'tsin's well-known idiosyncratic approach to 
personnel and policy decisions exacerbates the situation. One is accustomed to 
rumors of the undue influence and self-interest of presidential friends on Yel'tsin's 
decisions. What has changed since the 1996 elections, and is accelerating now, 
is the perception that the delicate presidential balancing act of interests is no 
longer within Yel'tsin's control. Now, policy appears as so many smashed plates 
on the floor. 
 
Russia after Yel'tsin 
Leading political scientists and intellectuals gathered recently for a conference to 
consider the post-Yel'tsin Russian political scene. President Yel'tsin, surprisingly 
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gracefully, sent his greetings to the attendees. (ITAR-TASS, 23 Jul 99; via 
Johnson's Russia List) Consensus was reached at the conference over the need 
to ensure the democratic transfer of power in the year 2000. Vyacheslav 
Nikonov, head of the Politika Foundation, pointed out his concerns of a possible 
roadblock to that goal: "The Kremlin Administration is the most destabilizing thing 
in the state...." I doubt many dissented from that view. 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
Chaika appointment confusion 
It now appears that one can say with some confidence that former acting 
Procurator-General Yuri Chaika has been appointed a deputy secretary of the 
Security Council. (NOVYE IZVESTIYA, 30 Jul 99; Agency WPS, via nexis) This 
follows a period of confusion when dueling Interfax (29 Jul 99; via nexis) reports, 
among others, first announced the appointment, made after a meeting between 
Chaika and the president, and then carried denials by Kremlin spokesman Dmitri 
Yakushkin that any meeting with Yel'tsin had occurred or any appointment 
signed. 
 
The appointment is predicated upon an acceptance of Chaika's resignation by 
the Federation Council. As it is widely assumed that Chaika's removal from the 
procurator's office is tied to his announced intention to continue investigations 
into Berezovsky- and Borodin-linked firms, Federation Council members may 
seek assurances from Chaika's named successor, former North Caucasus-based 
Prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov, that he will not discontinue these high-profile 
investigations. (MOSCOW TIMES, 30 Jul 99; Independent Press, via nexis) 
 
GOVERNMENT 
The candid prime minister 
What do you do as a hard-edged top police official when you suddenly find 
yourself appointed prime minister, amid one of the most rumor-heavy moments 
of elite influence pedaling in recent Russian history? Sergei Stepashin's choice 
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has been to eschew political niceties, except the pro forma nods of loyalty to 
Yel'tsin, and plainly state his partisan view of society. 
 
In an interview with Argumenty i fakty (14 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0715, via 
World News Connection), Stepashin responds to a question about his role in 
finding a "balance in society" by remarking, "One cannot maintain [balance] 
constantly by spending all one's time seeking agreement with idiots, enemies and 
scum...." 
 
On the subject of rising fuel prices, the former MVD chief was equally candid, 
suggesting that "we might...put a policeman on every petrol pump. (...) [T]he bad 
boys must be punished."  
 
Stepashin further claimed that the president has authorized him to conduct "mini-
security council sessions" on a weekly basis. This may explain the confusion in 
recent reports of Security Council membership and meeting times. It appears 
entirely plausible that there are two parallel Security Council structures at work. It 
is unclear which wields greater influence. 
 
Whatever the strength of Stepashin's conviction, backbone or intentions, one 
overwhelming political factor may sink him if the Berezovsky-influenced "family" 
continues to exert pressure on the government: Stepashin retains ties to the 
ambitious, popular former prime minister, Yevgeni Primakov. Despite disclaimers 
by Stepashin that Primakov, were he to re-enter politics, would not "engage in 
games designed to hurt the President", his actions as prime minister certainly 
suggested a willingness to strike close to the president and it is unlikely the 
Kremlin has so soon forgotten. Primakov remains a potentially dangerous force, 
as evidenced in the attempts by various political movements to court him, and 
the "family" is consequently cautious in its relationship with him. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
Using the 'Kosovo precedent'... 
In trips to the United States, Britain and Southeast Asia, Russian officials 
portrayed themselves as defenders of international institutions and state 
sovereignty in contrast to the American government, with its penchant for 
aggressive acts in the name of human rights. Although by turns hostile and 
friendly to the United States, the campaigns were carefully tailored to further 
long-standing Russian interests. 
 
...in Asia... 
During his visit to the annual meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov used the case of Kosovo 
as an example of what might happen in other parts of the world if the United 
States were allowed to found a "unipolar" international order. The bombing of 
Yugoslavia was a "relapse into a position-of-strength policy" that ignored "the 
fundamental norms and principles of international law," Ivanov said. (ITAR-TASS, 
26 Jul 99; via nexis) 
 
Portraying the United States as an aggressive and destabilizing force suited 
Ivanov's main objective at the summit -- to muster opposition to a proposed joint 
US-Japanese antiballistic missile system. In interviews and in his talk, Ivanov 
consistently contrasted two visions of the "new world order." On the one hand, 
Ivanov said, Russia and China adhere to their "special responsibility in 
safeguarding peace and international security" and "firmly safeguard the UN 
Charter and international law, and closely coordinate our stand on resolving 
regional conflicts and other practical issues." (GUANGMING RIBAO (internet 
version), 26 Jul 99; FBIS-CHI-1999-0728, via World News Connection) On the 
other hand, the Japanese and Americans were pursuing a project that risked "the 
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inevitably ensuing polarization of forces" and that was "fraught with the creation 
of dividing lines in the Asia-Pacific region." (ITAR-TASS, 26 Jul 99; via nexis) 
 
...and in Europe 
Meanwhile, Russian representatives returned to the Russian-NATO Permanent 
Joint Council on 23 July, ending a four-month boycott in protest of attacks on 
Yugoslavia. Even in returning to talks with the alliance, the Russian foreign 
ministry attempted to gain favor among the alliance's European members at the 
expense of the United States. Although the organization had been established in 
1997 at Russian insistence, Ivanov portrayed the decision to resume talks as a 
concession, and expressed hope that the alliance would now meet its obligation, 
as Moscow portrayed it, not to act without consulting Russia. "It is essential," 
Ivanov said, "to agree fully to comply with the terms of the Founding Act so that 
there are no surprises on either side." (INTERFAX, 1541 GMT, 22 Jul 99; FBIS-
WEU-1999-0722, via World News Connection) 
 
During talks in London, Ivanov stressed that the US had spoiled negotiations 
preceding NATO's attacks by surprising the Serbs with threats to act on military 
plans in preparation for more than a year. (ITAR-TASS, 2120 GMT, 18 Jul 99; via 
nexis) The Russians then delayed their return by a further four days in protest of 
draft declarations that US representatives had prepared. The move apparently 
worked, as at least one non-American diplomat in Brussels complained that "the 
other Alliance members are furious at the Americans," insisting Russia had 
"really made a gesture." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 23 Jul 99; via nexis) 
 
When repeated during Ivanov's visit to Britain, the Russian position appeared to 
move British Foreign Minister Robin Cook to poetry and generosity. "The future 
will not be facing each other as opponents across a chess board, but across a 
bridge which we want to make wider and stronger," Cook said, as he promised 
Britain would take a "positive and constructive approach" on loans to Russia from 
 6 
the International Monetary Fund. (PRESS ASSOCIATION NEWSFILE, 22 Jul 99; 
via nexis) 
 
Friends again? 
While Ivanov was promoting the Russian and Chinese variant of international 
relations to receptive audiences, Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin was 
painting a far different picture for American business leaders and government 
officials. In contrast to Ivanov's pessimism about the United States' role in the 
world, Stepashin insisted that America still had a part to play in the Russian 
economy, especially in "the supply of credit and cooperation in the space and 
aviation fields" and in "the removal of trade barriers." (ITAR-TASS, 29 Jul 99; via 
nexis) 
 
Stepashin's insistence that the Russian government and economy had not been 
taken over by criminal elements was somewhat undercut by his choice of 
traveling companions. Washington businessmen attending a dinner for Stepashin 
in Seattle were disturbed to find among them Yevgeni Nazdratenko, the governor 
of Primorsky Krai frequently accused of extorting funds from international 
businesses. David Gens, director of finance of Far East Maritime Services, a 
Seattle company, told the Seattle Post-Intelligencer that his business partner in 
Russia had been asked to contribute 10 percent of the firm's revenues to 
Nazdratenko's re-election campaign. (SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 24 Jul 
99; via nexis) 
 
Stepashin may not have known of his colleague's means of seeking elected 
office, but he was clearly capable of offering his own form of quid pro quo. Talk of 
the American-Japanese missile defense system appears to have prompted him 
to promise again to seek passage of START-II and START-III treaties in the 
Russian legislature. Although opposition in the Duma to the treaties virtually 
ensures that they will not be passed, the Russian government may calculate that 
it can play on Asian fears of a destabilizing West to portray the Antiballistic 
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Missile Treaty and disarmament talks as the best means of pursuing security. In 
exploiting Asian concerns for control of territory in the face of a West determined 
to liberate ethnic groups, Moscow continues to try to squeeze influence around 
the globe from its opposition to the Kosovo campaign.  
 
Ivanov milks multipolarism in ASEAN forum 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) -- held in Singapore from 25-27 July -- could 
have gone unnoticed amid the foreign policy ruckus created by Russian Prime 
Minister Sergei Stepashin's first visit to the US and the first NATO Permanent 
Joint Council (PJC) session since the bombings began in Yugoslavia. Not 
surprisingly, the bilateral meeting held on the ARF sidelines between Russian 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
received more attention than the forum itself, which addressed regional and 
international issues including the Taiwan Straits, the Korean peninsula, and US 
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) development. Although the Russian-US talks 
stole the limelight, the forum also gave clues about the shape of Russia's post-
Kosovo policy. 
 
The ARF was established in 1994 as a forum to address issues of regional and 
international security. In 1999, ARF remains the only security-focused 
international organization for the Pan-Pacific region. Currently, 22 members 
compose ARF, including 10 ASEAN member states and 10 dialogue partners, 
plus Mongolia and Papau New Guinea. (KYODO, 0241 GMT, 26 Jul 99; FBIS-
EAS-0726-1999, via World News Connection) The US, Russia, China and the 
EU are represented as dialogue partners.  
 
On the sidelines of the forum, Ivanov and Albright held their first talks since their 
early summer meeting in Helsinki. Although little of substance was achieved at 
the bilateral talks beyond the establishment of another Russia-US "hotline" to 
facilitate communications, when viewed in conjunction with the Stepashin visit 
and PJC meeting, Russia's effort to renew relations -- albeit cautiously -- with the 
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US becomes apparent. Within the forum itself, Ivanov and Albright's convergent 
views on possible North Korean ARF membership suggested that at least they 
were able to look beyond Kosovo to agree on other areas of concern.  
 
Despite the success of the bilateral talks, Russia still took advantage of the 
opportunity to use Kosovo's "lessons" to its political advantage within ARF. With 
so many "major powers" present and numerous issues of international interest 
steaming throughout Southeast Asia, there was abundant reason for the "lessons 
of Kosovo" to take the lead at the meeting. The ARF chairman's summary 
contained an implicit criticism of the US-led NATO actions in Kosovo. Kosovo 
raises important concerns about "stable relations among the major powers" and 
"respect for the basic principles of international law." (XINHUA, 26 Jul 99; via 
cnn.com) This summary paralleled Ivanov's more explicit speech to the forum, in 
which he placed heavy emphasis on the Russian policy of multipolarism, 
correlating it with "international stability and sustainable democratic 
development." Ivanov specifically used scenarios of US unilateralism -- such as 
Kosovo and TMD efforts in Japan -- to drive his point home. (ITAR-TASS, 0923 
GMT, 26 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-0726-1999, via World News Connection) In effect, 
Ivanov singled out NATO's faulty course in Kosovo and the United States' 
headstrong pursuit of TMD in Japan as evidence of unilateralism gone bad.  
 
The multipolar message that Ivanov brought to the forum is not new; former 
Prime Minister Primakov pursued the same policy throughout his tenures as 
foreign and prime minister. Under this policy, Russia has reached out to Asian 
countries that share Russian suspicions of NATO and the US to attract new 
strategic and economic "partners." (See The NIS Observed, 14 Jul 99.) The 
simultaneous emphasis on cautiously rebuilding bilateral US relations and 
continuing the Asian "constructive dialogue" displayed at the ARF meeting 
reveals the substance of Russia's post-Kosovo policy for Asia and the world. 
Russia has used the Kosovo example to exploit weaknesses in US policy and is 
now mending fences with the US even as it criticizes the US leadership. Some of 
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the Asian participants at the ARF seemed receptive to this message. Luckily, as 
Ivanov made apparent at the forum, these realities fit nicely into the rhetoric of 
multipolarism. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Yel'tsin's office becomes campaign headquarters 
In most democracies a strict separation is held between party politics and the 
affairs of state, if only in form. In Russia, the power of the president's office 
clearly is being harnessed to aid the fortunes of one side in the upcoming Duma 
elections.  
 
President Boris Yel'tsin, Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, presidential Chief of 
Staff Aleksander Voloshin and regional leaders met to discuss the possible 
unification of reformist movements. This much is acceptable. But when Yel'tsin 
suggested that the cabinet ministers should become "a drawing center," that is, 
the center of the reformist parties, the executive branch of the Russian 
government ceased to represent the needs of every Russian regardless of 
political affiliation and became another partisan political organization. This can 
only lead to increased tensions between branches of the federal government and 
cause different political factions to take control of their respective institutions and 
openly use them as party platforms. (INTERFAX, 1157 GMT, 9 Jul 99; FBIS-
SOV-1999-0709, via World News Connection) 
 
On one hand, Yel'tsin's open request to turn his office into a politburo for his 
reformist cause is a refreshing admission of what has been in fact the case for a 
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very long time. But form or image is very important in a democracy where the 
integrity of the system is the currency of legitimacy, and integrity is built upon the 
premise that the political system is essentially open to everyone and is 
evenhanded in its dealings. 
 
Yel'tsin's stated purpose is to prevent the Communists from controlling the Duma 
after the December elections, so he plans to use his position to unite all non-
Communist parties. To this end, Yel'tsin invited Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov to 
attend the meeting, though the invitation was declined. It is, therefore, confusing 
as to why the president, or his henchmen, have initiated a fight with Luzhkov in 
the country's major media outlets with attacks on the mayor's wife and other 
members of his family. More on this below. (INTERFAX, 1157 GMT, 9 Jul 99; 
FBIS-SOV-1999-0709, via World News Connection) 
 
MEDIA 
Battles between media empires emerge 
When Russian media barons draw lines in the sand and launch particularly nasty 
invective at each other, it must be election season. The two participants in this 
particular sumo wresting match are business mogul and presidential insider Boris 
Berezovsky and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. At a time when both sides should 
stand united to minimize the Communists' chances in the upcoming election, they 
have instead decided to take their disagreements to a public weary yet always 
intrigued by the presumed machinations of the powerful. 
 
It is difficult to determine when the battle actually began. Berezovsky and 
Luzhkov do not particularly like each other, and in the very personalized 
atmosphere of Russian politics, the personal dislikes of the powerful 
automatically become affairs of public concern. This recent flare-up seems to be 
a response to a Federal Security Service (FSB) investigation of Luzhkov's wife, 
Yelena Baturina, for which Luzhkov holds Berezovsky responsible. The Vladimir 
regional branch of the FSB is reported to have raided the offices of Inteko, a 
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plastic manufacturer headed by Ms. Baturina, and seized the firm's bank 
accounts. The raids were made in connection with an investigation into a number 
of Moscow-based companies and a local Vladimir bank allegedly involved in a 
plan to ship money illegally to the Pacific Island of Nauru, a well-known tax 
haven. Over the course of the same investigation, the FSB has reportedly also 
investigated firms belonging to Viktor Baturin, Luzhkov's brother-in-law. The 
mayor claims that his wife's company does not have an office in Vladimir and he 
stands by his wife. (NTV, 18 Jul 99; via Jamestown Foundation Monitor) 
 
The real reason for the conflict between Berezovsky and Luzhkov is a struggle 
for power and over who will influence the upcoming elections. Berezovsky has 
said that he would not mind if Luzhkov's Fatherland party were to be seated in 
the new Duma, but that Luzhkov would make a disastrous president of the 
federation. It also does not help that Luzhkov is on friendly terms with the 
country's most popular politician, ex-prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, an old foe 
of Berezovsky.  
 
But it is now widely understood by the Russian elite that control over the means 
of information is the way to power. Yel'tsin's amazing comeback in the 1996 
presidential election was clearly the result of the heavy support given to his 
candidacy by the country's media. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 13 Jul 99) 
 
There are at least two interesting points here. The first is that this battle is 
occurring on the right, that is, without the Communists and their allies, the 
Agrarians. This might be an indication of creeping irrelevance of the Communists 
in Russian politics. Of course the Communists remain important, but it looks like 
the new Russian political landscape might be shifting from discussions of left-
right, or Communist-democrat, to discussions of how to make the market 
economy work. This would leave the Communists as a much diminished, though 
still sizable, anti-establishment party. Whether this opposition would by "loyal" 
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remains to be seen. The results of the upcoming Duma elections might provide 
some indication of whether this is in fact happening. 
 
The second, and potentially more important point, is that if the powerful forces on 
the right spend the next four or five months slinging mud at each other, they may 
end up turning the electorate off and handing a victory over to the Communists 
and friends again. Divide and conquer is an old method of defeating the 
undefeatable, and it seems that the right side of the political spectrum is divided 
and thus conquering itself. That said, the left is no more organized, so who 
knows? 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
GUUAM grows up 
Two months ago, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev de-emphasized the 
strategic importance of the GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, 
and Moldova) group, saying that its existence didn't imply "the formation of an 
alternative military mini-bloc on CIS territory." (SNARK, 1505 GMT, 20 May 99; 
FBIS-SOV-1999-0520, via World News Connection) At the time of Sergeev's 
remarks, GUUAM still publicly maintained that it was an economic grouping of 
like-minded nations, not a military bloc. By July, however, events in the CIS led 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to assess that the group had become a 
political-military bloc. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 26 Jul 99) Although it might appear 
that a seismic shift of GUUAM's focus occurred this summer, in reality, the 
group's strategic component is neither new nor surprising.  
 
A look at GUUAM's formation reveals its strategic heritage. Although the group 
didn't really begin to solidify until its Fall 1997 meeting on the sidelines of the 
Council of Europe in Strasbourg, its members have been working together within 
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the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Flank Agreement dialogue since 1996. 
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 1 Dec 97) Drawn together by strategic and economic 
concerns, the then three-member group distrusted Russia's domination in energy 
and internal territorial issues. Together, they lobbied for the CFE Flank 
Agreement and opened a subregional dialogue that slowly matured over the next 
three years. However, from the beginning the alliance downplayed its strategic 
aspect, arguing that it was primarily an economic-based organization. 
 
Recently, GUUAM began to show its true, strategic colors by using its leverage 
within the Russian-led CIS. In April, three GUUAM members (Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan) withdrew from the CIS Collective Security Treaty, 
and at the June CIS Heads of Government meeting, members of the group 
reportedly worked together to stymie Russian-led initiatives on CIS economic 
integration and restructuring. (BELORUSSKAYA DELOVAYA, 7 Jun 99; FBIS-
SOV-1999-0607, via World News Connection) (See The NIS Observed, 26 Apr 
99.) Through these efforts, the group has established a name for itself as the 
"anti-Russian" bloc within the CIS. 
 
While CIS relations have trudged along at a snail's pace, inter-GUUAM relations 
have gained momentum. At recent bilateral meetings, Georgia, Ukraine, and 
Azerbaijan signed NATO-GUUAM cooperation agreements which will only feed 
Russian paranoia over NATO influence in the region. (See The NIS Observed, 
14 Jul 99.) In a mid-May press report, Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Grigola 
Katamadze unsurprisingly said that military cooperation element within GUUAM 
comes from coinciding strategic interests. (INTERFAX, 0809 GMT, 11 May 99; 
FBIS-SOV-1999-0511, via World News Connection) Most recently, Ukrainian 
Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk revealed specific measures meant to 
"institutionalize" GUUAM's economic and strategic cooperation efforts -- all of 
which, inevitably, will be unsatisfactory to the Russians. (Jamestown Foundation 
MONITOR, 7 Jul 99) Among the foreign minister's suggestions were a jointly 
administered Caspian-Central European oil transportation project, a joint 
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Abkhazian peacekeeping operation under the aegis of the OSCE or the UN, and 
the continuation and expansion of joint military education and supply projects. 
The first would compete with Russia's preexisting energy markets, the second -- 
although already partially underway -- would only heighten Russian concerns 
about Western influence, and the third would give Georgia -- with which Russia 
has had particularly bad relations -- access to naval technology and hardware 
through Ukraine. 
 
All signs point to GUUAM's ascendance within the region. Although it is not yet a 
direct competitor with the CIS, it certainly constitutes a dissident voice within it. 
GUUAM's recent successes only draw attention to the practically moribund state 
of affairs within the CIS. Furthermore, despite the muted Russian response thus 
far, Ivanov's remarks indicate that Russia is taking note of the situation. Russia 
continues to view the entire CIS in territorial terms and has placed an emphasis 
in the past on maintaining influence throughout CIS "territory." In an election 
year, it seems unlikely that this policy will change, but it also seems unlikely, 
given Russian commitments elsewhere, that Russia is in a position to challenge 
GUUAM's ascendance. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
How many Ukrainians does it take to screw in the plutonium? 
There may be no quicksand in Ukraine, but its leaders undoubtedly know what it 
feels like. Ukraine continued fighting energy shortages this week, while at the 
same time reiterating its demands that the G-7 fulfill its agreement to fund 
replacement nuclear reactors for Chernobyl. The country met with little success 
on either front. In fact, the situation worsened. Gazprom announced plans to cut 
gas supplies further; seven of Ukraine's 14 nuclear reactors were, or will soon be, 
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temporarily shut down for repairs; almost two thousand miners and their wives 
began long-term protest marches over wage arrears; Ukraine agreed to write off 
most Russian debt related to the Black Sea Fleet as partial repayment of its $1 
billion debt for gas; agricultural experts suggested that Ukraine's grain harvest 
would be the lowest in five years largely due to fuel shortages; villagers began 
blocking the border to Poland at Medyka after their electricity was cut off; and 
both the G-7 and EU took no final action on funding Ukraine's two new nuclear 
reactors.  
 
Last but not least, three workers at the Chernobyl plant were exposed to "high 
levels" of radiation. The workers were exposed to "between one and nine rems of 
radiation" while they were checking the welds on Chernobyl's one functioning 
reactor, according to spokesman Oleg Goloskokov. The maximum yearly 
allowable dose is five rems. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 1227 GMT, 19 Jul 
99; via nexis) The reactor is temporarily closed for repairs.  
 
According to another spokesperson, Nadiya Shumak, the accident happened 
when "the source of radiation fell out of the monitoring device." (REUTERS, 20 
Jul 99; via Russia Today) Just a few days earlier, a 3mm thick and 80mm long 
pipe was destroyed when a worker failed to notice that it was attached to the 
loading vehicle he was driving. (ITAR-TASS, 0553 GMT, 16 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0716, via World News Connection)  
 
Meanwhile, the head of Energoatom, which runs Ukraine's nuclear industry, was 
issued a reprimand for not completing repairs to the country's largest reactors on 
time. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 2013 GMT, 28 Jul 99; via nexis) However, 
the accidents at Chernobyl had nothing to do with the safety of the plant, 
according to Vitaly Tolstonogov, the plant's managing director. "We can say that 
the personnel are guilty," he explained, blaming low morale resulting from wage 
arrears stretching back months. No doubt, this explanation was comforting to 
those living in the area of Chernobyl. 
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In the one slightly positive energy development recently, the European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development released a $116 million tranche to Ukraine to 
assist in "urgent" repairs on the sarcophagus over Chernobyl's reactor 4. The 
EBRD has now distributed just over $260 million of the promised $760 million to 
build a new sarcophagus, known as Sarcophagus 2. (REUTERS, 21 Jul 99; via 
Russia Today) During German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's visit to Kyiv in 
early July, he spoke for the EU when he said, "The sarcophagus is really a time 
bomb, but we only have half the funds needed to carry out repairs." (AGENE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, 23 Jul 99; via Russia Today) Not to worry -- like the funds for 
Ukraine's nuclear reactors, there is probably plenty of time. Only 10 percent of 
the sarcophagus is cracked, after all. And, Ukraine still has 60 percent of the 
energy production it needs. There's plenty of time. 
 
A trip through the election funhouse 
Like an amusement park funhouse, the election season in Ukraine has become a 
game of figuring out what is real, what is really happening, and who is really 
telling the truth. It is a case of heightened paranoia -- perhaps realistic, perhaps 
not. 
 
From television stations being closed by the state, to purported investigations by 
the Secret Service, to accusations of rigged polls, to one candidate being pelted 
with tomatoes, this election season has gone into full swing. First, Communist 
presidential candidate Petro Symonenko charged that "a recurrent provocation is 
being prepared against me .... To compromise me, it is planned to open an 
account abroad in the name of my son." Symonenko then went on to deny ever 
having a bank account abroad. (KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, 21 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0722, via World News Connection) Of course, if an account is found, it will 
have been planted. Right? 
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Next, the Ukrainian government rescinded the broadcast licenses for four 
television stations in the Crimean Republic. The Association of Free Journalists 
quickly protested that "the only TV companies left operating ... are those that 
support the same candidate." (ITAR-TASS, 1547 GMT, 26 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0726, via World News Connection)  
 
Shortly thereafter, Socialist Party leader and presidential candidate Oleksandr 
Moroz claimed that a Russian-language television station, Inter Television, was 
announcing rigged poll numbers, the head of the Central Election Commission, 
Mykhaylo Ryabets, said that "some people" have tried to blackmail him, and 
former Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk accused the tax administration of 
punishing candidates, while suggesting that all candidates need armed guards.  
 
Meanwhile, Deputy (but not presidential candidate) Hryhoriy Omelchenko 
claimed that a "top secret" document showed a pattern of investigating local 
media by the Ukrainian Secret Service (SSS). The document, which may have 
been real, would have had more weight if Omelchenko had not also claimed that 
the SSS was planning to assassinate him. (INTELNEWS, 0600 GMT, 29 Jul 99; 
FBIS-SOV-1999-0729, via World News Connection) 
 
And finally, Moroz was pelted with tomatoes during a campaign stop, and 
Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko took the high road at another event when he 
explained, "I do not want to say anything bad about [presidential candidate] 
Natalya Vitrenko because she is a woman. Had she not been a woman, I would 
have put it differently. We treat women well." (UT-1 TELEVISION NETWORK, 
1800 GMT, 25 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0726, via World News Connection) 
 
Thank goodness that Tkachenko, Moroz and Marchuk have decided to put this 
behavior aside by signing a "Fair Elections Agreement." The agreement includes 
calls for equal access to the media, an end to "crude agitation and propaganda," 
and elimination of "violence, threats and bribes." (UNIAN, 1030 GMT, 28 Jul 99; 
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BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via nexis) Curiously missing is a call to 
discuss the actual issues facing the country. But, for those who worry that this 
agreement might lead to peace, love, and a boring election, don't be concerned. 
When asked to sign the document, President Kuchma responded, "I think those 
guys weren't feeling too well when they were saying these things. ... Well, my 
dear people, I've had mud slung at me by some of these people and it keeps 
coming. I will never put my signature next to his (sic)." (UT THIRD PROGRAM, 
1700 GMT, 31 Jul 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via nexis) 
 
BELARUS 
Takes a lickin' and keeps on tickin' 
On 29 January 1999, following large-scale protests against the Russia-Belarus 
Union Declaration, Semyon Sharetsky, speaker of the disbanded 1996 
parliament, said, "Favorable conditions have now developed in Belarus for 
overthrowing Aleksandr Lukashenka's anti-people dictatorial regime, and this 
chance should not be missed." (BELAPAN, 1605 GMT, 29 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-
99-030, via World News Connection) (For further background, see Editorial 
Digest, 15 Feb 99.) 
 
On 20 July, Sharetsky and his fellow opposition members tried their best, but 
failed. That date marked the official, internationally accepted end of President 
Aleksandr Lukashenka's term. It also marked the beginning of the week 
celebrating Belarus' Independence Day on 27 July. That commemoration was 
abolished by Lukashenka in 1996 -- the same year that he abolished the elected 
parliament.  
 
Between 3,500-5000 protesters converged on Minsk on 21 July, the first day of 
Lukashenka's "new term." The protesters held a four-hour demonstration outside 
the president's headquarters, while Sharetsky announced that he had signed a 
decree declaring himself the president of Belarus. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 
2356 GMT, 22 Jul 99; via nexis) The legitimate constitution of Belarus names the 
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speaker of parliament as acting president in the event of a vacancy in the office 
of the president. A large number of persons were arrested, although figures listed 
by media sources range from 10 to 70.  
 
On 27 July, another 3,000 protesters gathered to celebrate Independence Day. 
Ten demonstrators were reportedly arrested during the protest, while its 
organizers were to be arrested later. Their heinous crime? Trying to enter 
Independence Square. (INTERFAX, 28 Jul 99; via nexis) 
 
Even before the Independence Day rally, however, Semyon Sharetsky had fled 
to Lithuania. It is surprising, actually, that Sharetsky waited as long as he did to 
leave. Sharetsky has watched as former prime minister and popular opposition 
leader Mikhail Chigir has remained in state custody since April, charged with 
"embezzlement." The arrest preceded Chigir's participation in May's "shadow" 
presidential elections.  
 
While Chigir is the most high-profile activist in detention, Amnesty International 
has compiled a list of others currently under arrest in Belarus that includes most 
of the prominent public figures opposed to Lukashenka: Vyacheslav Sivchik, 
leader of the Popular Party; Andrey Klimov, a (disbanded) 13th Supreme Soviet 
deputy; Valery Shchukin, 13th Supreme Soviet deputy; Anatoly Grikhytik, Yury 
Ostrovsky and Ivan Suntsov, activists; Pavel Znavets, 13th Supreme Soviet 
deputy and leader of the Charter 97 human rights group; Oleg Volchek, Minsk 
City Council deputy; and Irina Halip, editor of the newspaper Imya. Halip was 
released recently. (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 23 Jul 99; M2 Presswire, via 
nexis) Several other prominent activists and independent journalists have also 
been repeatedly arrested, questioned, had their property confiscated and then 
been released.  
 
Add to this the lukewarm support given to him by Western countries and 
institutions, and it is no wonder that Sharetsky fled the country. While the OSCE, 
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EU and United States all released statements calling for free, democratic 
elections, and recognizing that Lukashenka's term ended on 20 July, the 
statements were also careful not to lend any overt support to Sharetsky and his 
fellow Supreme Soviet deputies. The EU statement said, for example, "The 
Union recalls that it does not recognize governments, and even less political 
personalities, but States, according to the most common international practice." 
(European Union, DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENCY ON BEHALF OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION ON BELARUS, 20 Jul 99) 
 
The United States Department of State, meanwhile, marked the "end of ... 
Lukashenka's legal term of office," and called on him to restore his "legitimacy" 
by holding free elections. It also recognized the 13th Supreme Soviet "as 
Belarus' sole legitimate parliament." But, the statement then called on "the 
government of Belarus to enter into a dialogue with the opposition ...." (US 
Department of State, PRESS STATEMENT by James P. Rubin, 20 Jul 99; via 
http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefs/statements) No doubt, Sharetsky grasped 
the significance of that sentence, and understood that his Western support was 
limited. 
 
He will, he said, continue to lead the opposition from Vilnius. It remains to be 
seen, however, whether an opposition can actually oppose from jail cells and 
foreign countries.  
 
MOLDOVA 
The spotlight shines 
Moldova found itself in an unusual position recently as the world's media focused 
on the country's role in the capture of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) rebel Cevat 
Soysal. The government, however, quickly realized that this was not the type of 
attention that it needed.  
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Although the role played by Moldova in Soysal's capture is still being debated, 
the fact is that Soysal was taken from Moldova by Turkish forces to Turkey to 
stand trial on charges of treason. He was probably arrested by the Moldovan 
security service, although the government officially denies this. Soysal likely 
arrived in Moldova in early July. 
 
Soysal was named during an interrogation by Abdullah Ocalan as being in 
charge of training rebels abroad -- particularly in Romania. The PKK, of course, 
denies this charge, and points out that Soysal was given political asylum by 
Germany recently. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, AM Cycle, 21 Jul 99; via nexis)  
 
Moldova's role in this affair has been highlighted by PKK members, which has led 
to much worry by government officials. It turned out that their concern was 
warranted -- at least on the surface. On 22 July, PKK leadership released a 
statement saying Moldova, Kenya and any other countries assisting Turkey 
would be "made to pay the bill sooner or later." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 
1135 GMT, 22 Jul 99; via nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Transcaucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
ARMENIA 
Compromise in sight? 
Presidents Heidar Aliev of Azerbaijan and Robert Kocharian of Armenia met in 
seclusion in Geneva on 16 July to discuss possible solutions to the deadlock 
over Nagorno-Karabakh. Each president gave positive assessments of the talks 
and of his counterpart, and suggested that the meeting may have inaugurated a 
new peace process.  
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If these summits replace the OSCE Minsk Group, that would indeed be a positive 
development. Ongoing negotiations, conducted on a bilateral basis, would lessen 
Russian influence over the outcome and shed the cumbersome bureaucracy of 
the OSCE process. The parties may still enlist the aid of a neutral facilitator, such 
as Switzerland or Poland, whose president, Aleksander Kwasniewski, recently 
offered his good offices to Kocharian. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 16 Jul 99) 
 
The planning of the meeting originated on the sidelines of the NATO summit in 
April, where Madeleine Albright hosted a discussion between the two presidents. 
The process was delayed by Aliev's heart surgery and recuperation in May and 
June.  
 
In mid-June the Armenian side attacked Azerbaijani positions to the north of 
Nagorno-Karabakh. The fighting on 14 June lasted for several hours and left two 
Azeri servicemen dead and several injured. Although the Armenian gains are 
minor (OSCE officials certified that the Armenian side moved the line of contact 
forward only a few hundred yards), Azerbaijani generals fear that the attack 
represented an attempt to isolate the city Gyandzha from the rest of Azerbaijan. 
(NEZAVIVIMAYA GAZETA, 18 Jun 99) Perhaps this incident, the most serious 
fighting since 1997, represented an Armenian attempt to obtain an even more 
forceful position on the eve of negotiations. Conversely, the fighting may not 
have had a strategic aim but revealed the degree of tension on the contact line 
and convinced the parties that a new peace process is needed. 
 
In Geneva Aliev and Kocharian indicated that they may be able to compromise: 
Armenia no longer insists on complete adherence to the last OSCE proposal for 
a "common-state" and Azerbaijan no longer insists on complete adherence to the 
OSCE's 1996 Lisbon declaration. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 22 Jul 99) 
Although the presidents have revealed very little information about the substance 
of the talks, they have already come under fire from the more nationalist 
segments of their countrymen.  
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In Azerbaijan the leaders of the opposition parties denounced Aliev, who they 
contend has bowed to US pressure and conceded too much already. The 
opposition holds that Azerbaijan's territorial integrity can only be secured through 
military parity, that Armenia will agree to return Azerbaijani districts only when 
Azerbaijan is in a position to take them back. One Azerbaijani paper, Azadlyg, 
interpreted Aliev's comment that "the greatest degree of self-government implies 
freedom anyway and it is nearly independence," to mean that he was ready to 
grant more concessions. Of course, that comment can be read to mean precisely 
the opposite: why seek independence when its equivalent, self-government, is 
readily available? Azadlyg made a more vexing point by noting that the status of 
Shusha and Lachin, two Azeri-populated towns situated between Armenia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, has been omitted from the public discussion in recent 
months, whereas it used to comprise a key Azerbaijani demand. (AZADLYG, 20 
Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0722, via World News Connection) 
 
For his part, President Kocharian received a stern warning from the Nagorno-
Karabakh leadership. Naira Melkumian, the foreign minister, rejected the 
Azerbaijan position, saying that "we are not going to hold negotiations between 
autonomy and a common state. We are going to hold negotiations between 
independence and a common state." Nagorno-Karabakh's sovereignty can be 
limited to the degree that another country can represent its foreign interests. If 
Armenia concedes too much, the Karabakh government can turn to "some other 
third country which is able to maintain our security. Most probably, the model of 
West Berlin can be an example for us." With respect to the army, finance and 
state structures, Nagorno-Karabakh expects to attain complete independence. 
(SNARK, 0550 GMT, 20 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0722, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Both governments sought to placate such sentiments by reiterating the less-
conciliatory elements of their positions. Azerbaijan still insists on a restoration of 
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its territorial integrity while Armenia will not commit itself without the blessing of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh government. 
 
GEORGIA 
A new 'strategic partnership' 
In a recent interview President Eduard Shevardnadze described relations 
between the US and Georgia as gradually assuming the qualities of a "strategic 
partnership." (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 22 Jul 99) The term, previously 
reserved for Russia, is rather ambiguous, but denotes very special relations, 
more friendly than a simple alliance. 
 
In recent months Georgia and Azerbaijan announced their intention to seek 
NATO membership. Their application will no doubt benefit from their participation 
in the Kosovo peacekeeping operation. Azerbaijan has dispatched a 30-member 
unit to serve as part of a Turkish battalion. (AZERBAIJAN BULLETIN, 27 Jul 99) 
Georgia will send 20 peacekeepers who will serve with the French or Turkish 
forces. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Rocket crash provides chance for new agreement on Baikonur 
The 5 July crash of Russia's Proton rocket in eastern Kazakhstan has permitted 
the Kazakh government to bring a number of long-standing concerns back into 
the media spotlight, as well as providing an opportunity to begin renegotiating its 
1994 Baikonur lease agreement with Russia. Kazakh authorities' first response to 
the incident was to ban all further rocket launches from the Baikonur 
cosmodrome, regardless of whether or not they were driven by heptyl fuel. After 
days of discussions between the two sides, on 14 July Russian Deputy Prime 
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Minister Ilya Klebanov finally announced that both governments had come to an 
agreement on virtually all the issues raised by the 5 July Proton rocket crash over 
part of Kazakhstan's eastern territory (INTERFAX, 1054 GMT, 14 Jul 99; FBIS-
SOV-1999-0714, via World News Connection), allowing Russian and Ukrainian 
rocket launches to resume. However, Kazakh officials have only lifted the ban on 
non-heptyl powered rockets; as of 3 August, the ban on Proton rocket launches 
from the Baikonur launch site was still very much in effect. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN 
NEWS, 3 Aug 99; via nexis) Furthermore, the Kazakh government continues to 
express its dissatisfaction with the 1994 Baikonur lease agreement, which denies 
Kazakhstan any share in the commercial profits that Russia garners from each 
rocket launch, and also deprives Kazakh authorities of the power to approve or 
prevent individual launches. Russia's failure to pay an annual $115 million in rent 
for its use of the Baikonur cosmodrome since 1994 is yet another issue which 
must be addressed, as well as Russian officials' disregard for past Kazakh 
concerns that the Baikonur spacecraft launches cause widespread environmental 
damage.  
 
Due to the fuel's toxicity, the Kazakh environmental ministry declared a ban on 
the launch of all rockets that use heptyl as early as last May, but Baikonur 
authorities chose to ignore the ministry's orders. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 
11 Jul 99; via nexis) It should come as no surprise, then, that the joint Kazakh-
Russian medical commission charged with investigating the ecological results of 
the recent crash has completely dismissed Kazakh officials' fears that the 
leakage of heptyl fuel from the Proton rocket may have caused environmental 
damage in Karaganda Region, and may pose a serious health hazard. The 
commission's first report to the Kazakh government stated that its members had 
found no signs of water or soil contamination from spilled rocket fuel and that all 
illnesses suffered by residents of the crash site were "the result of psychological 
stress caused by the incident." (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 29 Jul 99; via 
nexis) Other Kazakh experts, however, have alleged that 66 tons of heptyl fuel 
were sprayed over Karaganda Region when the rocket fell. (ITAR-TASS, 1432 
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GMT, 9 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0709, via World News Connection) In all, 40 
large and 100 small rocket fragments were found in Karakaly district (east of the 
city Karaganda), including pieces of the fuel tank. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 
20 Jul 99; via nexis) There have even been reports that the Baianaul National 
Park in Kazakhstan's northern Pavlodar Region has suffered heptyl 
contamination. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 8 Jul 99; via nexis) 
 
The Russian government has declared its willingness to pay Kazakhstan for any 
material damages which the rocket crash may have incurred, which Russian 
officials have estimated to be in the range of $230,000-$270,000, although 
Kazakhstan's own experts have tallied the cost of the damage at approximately 
$287,444 (equivalent to 38 million tenge). (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 30 Jul 
99; via nexis) However, Russia will not pay compensation directly to the 
residents of the crash site area, despite regional officials' efforts to obtain 
remuneration for harm suffered by the local population. The residents of 
Karbyshevka, a village in Karaganda Region where large rocket fragments were 
found, have gone so far as to demand that they be temporarily resettled until the 
scope of the health threats posed by the rocket debris has been fully determined. 
The villagers have complained that they are also experiencing adverse economic 
effects from the rocket crash because they have been unable to sell their meat 
and dairy products to anyone since 5 July. However, with the exception of 
granting a few small individual damage claims, the Kazakh government has 
ignored the Karaganda Region population's requests for resettlement or 
monetary compensation. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 14 Jul 99; via nexis) 
Kazakh authorities' lack of reaction to the villagers' concerns could well be 
directly connected to Russia's refusal to admit that the spacecraft's crash poses 
either a health hazard or an environmental threat.  
 
In order to persuade Kazakh officials to lift at least partially the launch ban, 
Russia once again promised to begin making rent payments for its lease of the 
Baikonur facilities, pledging to give the Kazakh government $50 million by the 
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end of 1999 and to provide another $65 million worth of goods and services over 
the course of the year 2000. No decisions have yet been made regarding the 
unpaid rent for 1994-1998, which Russia would prefer simply to subtract from 
Kazakhstan's debts for Russian energy supplies to a number of regions on the 
Kazakh-Russian border. (DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, 1444 CET, 14 Jul 
99; via nexis) It is somewhat questionable, however, whether Kazakhstan will 
receive even the 1999 rent payments, since the Russian government has yet to 
ratify the 1994 Baikonur lease agreement and is also considering transferring 
control of the Baikonur cosmodrome from the defense ministry to the Russian 
aerospace agency. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 14 Jul 99; via nexis) Until it is 
clear from what part of the budget the rent money should be taken, the Kazakh 
government may not receive any funds from Russia at all.  
 
Kazakhstan's administration will receive another opportunity to extract 
concessions from the Russian government later in August, when the two sides 
meet to renegotiate the Baikonur lease agreement. Each party is to draft an 
auxiliary agreement by 1 September on such issues as: the creation of a joint 
emergency procedure in the event of another accident involving a Baikonur 
rocket launch; environmental protection measures and the extent of Russia's 
liability for damages caused by spacecraft explosions on Kazakh territory; and 
the establishment of quotas for further Proton rocket launches. According to 
Meirbek Moldabekov, director of the Kazakh National Aerospace Agency, 
Russian officials have even proclaimed themselves willing to consider sharing 
the commercial profits from each rocket launch (estimated at approximately $85 
million per launch) with the Kazakh government. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 
21 Jul 99; via nexis) 
 
It remains to be seen whether the Kazakh side will stand firm and maintain its 
ban on Proton rocket launches until its demands are met, or whether President 
Nazarbaev's desire for cordial relations with Russia will cause any of 
Kazakhstan's interests to be sacrificed during the next phase of the Baikonur 
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negotiations. On the one hand, Kazakh officials have found a relatively easy 
means of exerting pressure on the Russian government, which will not have a 
cosmodrome capable of launching unusually heavy spacecraft for some years to 
come. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 30 Jul 99; via nexis) On the other hand, it 
is still very much in Kazakhstan's interests to maintain a good relationship with 
Russia, if for no other reason than that Russia is still Kazakhstan's largest trade 
partner. Furthermore, Kazakhstan's longest border by far is with the Russian 
Federation, giving the Russian side considerable influence over Kazakh trade 
routes. Lastly, Kazakhstan is still dependent on Russian goodwill for exporting a 
portion of its petroleum resources. Kazakhstan's economic vulnerability to the 
effects of Russia's financial crises became painfully apparent last autumn, when 
the tenge's value plunged in response to the fall of the Russian ruble. Needless 
to say, the Kazakh delegation does not face an easy task as it approaches the 
renegotiation of the 1994 Baikonur lease agreement. 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Disputes with Uzbekistan continue to create tensions 
Despite Kyrgyz Prime Minister Amangeldi Muraliev's recent visit to Tashkent, 
during which he signed a number of "mutual cooperation" agreements in an effort 
to promote cordial Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations, the two governments have yet to 
resolve their most significant disputes. Prime Minister Muraliev was unable to 
come to a compromise over the price of the Uzbek natural gas upon which much 
of Kyrgyzstan depends for heat and hot water, nor was he able to settle long-
standing disagreements over mutual debts for water and electricity supplies. 
Controversies over the ownership rights to industrial enterprises located in the 
Kyrgyz-Uzbek border regions have created further tensions. (KYRGYZ 
TELEVISION FIRST CHANNEL, 1430 GMT, 12 Jul 99; BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via nexis) 
 
Trade turnover between the two countries has suffered severely in response to 
these types of disputes, falling by 52 percent in 1998 alone. Over the past six 
 29 
months Uzbekistan has imposed strict limits on traffic crossing into Kyrgyzstan, 
angering Kyrgyz officials and eventually prompting them to take similar actions. 
(VECHERNIY BISHKEK, 12 Jul 99; BBC Worldwide Monitoring Central Asia Unit; 
via nexis) 
 
Kyrgyzstan may be able to solve its natural gas supply difficulties by simply 
finding another source of fuel, namely, Kazakhstan. On 30 July, Kyrgyz gas 
officials announced that they will soon begin buying gas from Kazakhstan at a 
lower price than the Uzbek gas company has required them to pay. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 2 Aug 99) This may provide Kyrgyz citizens and industries with a 
more stable source of fuel and also deprive the Uzbek government of at least 
one method of exerting pressure on President Akaev's administration. 
 
However, there seems to be no way of protecting Kyrgyz citizens from the whims 
of Uzbekistan's security forces. A human rights coordinator in Kyrgyzstan's 
Jalalabad Province (close to the Uzbek border) has reported that over the past 
year at least 10 Kyrgyz citizens have been kidnapped by Uzbek interior ministry 
units and transported back to Uzbekistan. The kidnap victims were arrested on 
suspicion of being "Wahhabis," (Jamestown Foundation PRISM, 16 Jul 99) a 
term which the Uzbek government now uses to describe virtually any Muslim who 
is suspected of opposing President Karimov's policies. A phenomenon which has 
alarmed Jalalabad's residents even further is that the Uzbek security personnel 
often seem to be in the company of persons who participated in the June 1990 
violence between Uzbek and Kyrgyz groups in Osh (a Kyrgyz city located south 
of Jalalabad). These persons were arrested and imprisoned, but have apparently 
now been set free, perhaps in order to help Uzbek law enforcement officers 
identify suspected Uzbek opposition members who reside in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
President Akaev has done little to prevent these illegal raids by Uzbek security 
forces into Kyrgyz territory, in fact, he has not even lodged an official protest with 
the Uzbek government. In a 7 July interview with Nezavisimaya gazeta, he went 
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so far as to call Kyrgyzstan's relations with Uzbekistan "good-neighborly." 
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 9 Jul 99) In fact, there may be little recourse for 
Kyrgyzstan with regard to the Uzbek government's acts of aggression against 
Kyrgyz citizens. Kyrgyzstan cannot afford to become involved in any type of 
armed conflict with Uzbekistan's far superior military forces and the Kyrgyz 
government does not have sufficient economic or political leverage to force the 
Uzbek interior ministry to become more observant of international law. 
Nonetheless, President Akaev's apparent refusal to confront the Uzbek 
government over its invasions of Kyrgyzstan's sovereign territory will certainly not 
discourage Uzbek security forces from repeating their raids. In fact, President 
Karimov's administration may even interpret the Kyrgyz president's silence as 
tacit approval which could embolden the Uzbek interior ministry to commit even 
more brazen acts. 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
UTO gives up claim to defense ministry post 
After weeks of negotiations, Tajik government and United Tajik Opposition (UTO) 
leaders have finally agreed on a date for the country's first national referendum, 
as well as on the issues to be voted on during the referendum. President 
Rahmonov also made a number of changes in his government, in order to bring 
his regime into compliance with the political protocol of the Inter-Tajik Peace 
Agreement, thereby meeting most of the opposition's latest demands. The UTO 
was granted administrative control over 14 geographical areas and additional 
opposition candidates were appointed to government posts both at the national 
and local level. However, one of the UTO's most long-standing demands, that 
Commander Mirzo Ziyo be granted the post of defense minister, was ultimately 
rejected by President Rahmonov. For as yet unstated reasons, the UTO 
leadership accepted the president's veto and agreed to Cmdr. Ziyo's appointment 
as minister of emergency situations and civil defense. 
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President Rahmonov's steadfast refusal to name a member of the UTO to lead 
the defense ministry, particularly such a prominent military figure as Mirzo Ziyo, 
is not at all surprising. There was undoubtedly tremendous opposition to Cmdr. 
Ziyo's appointment among the president's allies in the government, to say 
nothing of the sentiments that the Russian troop commanders in Tajikistan must 
have expressed at the prospect of ceding the defense ministry to the opposition. 
The Jamestown Foundation Monitor has suggested that the main reason behind 
President Rahmonov's unwavering rejection of Mirzo Ziyo's nomination to the 
post of defense minister is the fact that this ministry is actually controlled by the 
Office of the Russian Military Advisor. According to the Monitor's report, this body 
consists of a group of Russian military officers which closely supervises the 
activities of Tajikistan's defense ministry and most likely is vehemently opposed 
to the appointment of a UTO member as defense minister. (Jamestown 
Foundation MONITOR, 21 Jul 99) Since defying the wishes of the Russian 
military officers stationed in Tajikistan could easily cause the collapse of his 
government, President Rahmonov can be expected to follow their directives with 
little hesitation. 
 
The UTO leadership's decision to accept the president's offer to make Cmdr. 
Ziyo the minister of emergency situations and civil defense is far more difficult to 
fathom. At the end of June, Tajikistan's parliament voted to upgrade the 
Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense to a ministry, in order to 
create an additional ministry post for the UTO, since by then it had become 
apparent that ceding the leadership of the defense ministry was totally out of the 
question. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1600 GMT, 1 Jul 99; 
BBC Worldwide Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via nexis) Thus, Cmdr. Ziyo's new 
post is not only much less influential than the position he was originally promised 
(the defense ministry is considered one of the "power ministries"), but most likely 
lacks all the resources that a more established ministry would have at its 
disposal. However, Said Abdullo Nuri (the chairman of the UTO) himself traveled 
out to Tavildora to persuade Cmdr. Ziyo to accept this much less prestigious 
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position, without any explanation for why he had so suddenly yielded to President 
Rahmonov over the issue. 
 
Perhaps Mr. Nuri believed that accepting a lower-ranking ministry post for Mirzo 
Ziyo was the only solution for breaking the deadlock between President 
Rahmonov's administration and the opposition and that the continuation of this 
deadlock would put the entire peace process at risk. It is very unlikely that 
President Rahmonov would have given in on this issue, regardless of the 
consequences. Over the past few years, the president has clearly indicated that 
he is unwilling to flout the wishes of the officers who command the Russian 
troops stationed in Tajikistan. In a case such as this one, where complying with 
the Russian officers' injunctions requires violating the terms of the Inter-Tajik 
Peace Agreement, there is little doubt how the situation would be resolved. 
President Rahmonov knows full well that while fulfilling the terms of the peace 
agreement will please his Western audience, it cannot guarantee his hold on the 
presidency, whereas carrying out policies dictated by his Russian military allies 
could keep him in power for many years to come. 
 
The questions which now arise are whether the unity of the UTO will withstand 
the concessions made by its leaders to the Tajik government and whether Mr. 
Nuri has discredited himself and his leadership ability in the eyes of his peers. 
Mirzo Ziyo has many supporters, a number of whom voiced their dissatisfaction 
at his exclusion from power in the past and may now choose to do so again, 
despite Cmdr. Ziyo's own acceptance of the circumstances. Mr. Nuri and the rest 
of the UTO leadership may be perceived as having made one too many 
concessions to President Rahmonov's regime and its Russian allies, in order to 
rescue a peace process that over the past several months seems to have mainly 
benefited the president and his administration. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
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By Kate Martin 
 
NATO continues to stroke Baltic feathers 
Meeting with the other members of the US-Baltic Partnership Commission, 
Strobe Talbott said that, while not foreordained, the inclusion of the Baltic states 
in NATO is "desirable." "[T]he three Baltic states are not only eligible for 
membership in the alliance, they are making very real and concrete progress in 
that direction. No country should be excluded from eligibility for the alliance on 
the grounds of either geography or history... I would stop just short of saying it's 
inevitable. It is desirable," he said. (US Department of State, DEPARTMENT 
BRIEFING, 16 Jul 99; Federal News Service, via nexis) Desirable for some, but 
certainly not for others. Russia's repeated demand that NATO not expand onto 
the territory of the former Soviet Union brought a succinct response from newly 
elected Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga: "I don't think they have any 
business making those sort of pronouncements.... They have oppressed these 
countries for 50 years, and that is quite enough." She also drew the line on how 
NATO should respond to Russian demands. "If this alliance now bows to 
totalitarian aims and efforts, I think it will have discredited itself in terms of the 
moral ground that it stands on. ...It would be a severe indictment of its moral 
stance and all the ideals of democracy that NATO is supposed to be protecting." 
She said. (TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, 9 Jul 99; Ventura County Star, via 
nexis) 
 
The Baltic states' lack of full membership did not stop invitations from 
headquarters to take part in the alliance's latest project. Secretary-General Javier 
Solana sent a formal invitation to Estonia to participate in the international peace 
mission in Kosovo on 13 July. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 
13 Jul 99) Two weeks earlier, the Estonian government had allocated funding to 
send 10 peacekeepers to Kosovo. Latvia, too, received from Solana "a political 
invitation to check our readiness" to take part in NATO ventures, according to 
Latvian Defense Minister Girtis Valdis Kristovskis. (INTERFAX, 1420 GMT, 12 
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Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0712, via World News Connection) The Latvian Saeima 
had already approved the deployment of 15 soldiers to Kosovo. At least one 
recent check on Latvia's readiness has brought a positive evaluation. Rear 
Admiral Christen H. Vinter of the Danish Royal Navy, visiting the port of Liepaja 
under the military cooperation program, reported that the preparedness and 
training of the Latvian Navy is on par with navies of NATO member states. (Baltic 
News Service DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 25 Jun 99) 
 
It may be summertime, but the livin' ain't easy 
Farmers in the agriculturally dependent Baltic states have been crying out for 
state-sponsored support for some time now, but the situation has continued to 
deteriorate. Estonian farmers are applying for 700 million kroons 
(US$45,690,000) in capital and direct subsidies from the government for next 
year. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 16 Jul 99) Lithuanian 
farmers took their concerns to the roads, crowding onto main thoroughfares. 
Sugar beet growers protested for about a week on a highway in the Marijampole 
district, while other farmers staged what they called a one-day precautionary 
picket rally on the main roads of the country. (Baltic News Service DAILY 
REPORT, 1300 GMT, 14 Jul 99) 
 
LATVIA 
Semantics hold up language law promulgation 
Although the Latvian Saeima did, indeed, pass the proposed language law in the 
third reading last month, discussion on the issue is nowhere near the end. The 
topic, upon which everyone in the international community feels quite free to 
comment, will remain unresolved until the fall session, when members of 
parliament can respond to the president's refusal on 14 July to promulgate the 
bill. 
 
President Vaira Vike-Freiberga did not make her decision lightly -- that would 
have been impossible given the international clamor the proposed bill had 
 35 
generated. Unlike many members of parliament who appeared to make their 
voting decision in defiance of outside observers, however, she clearly heard the 
message despite the messengers. And there were plenty of those. The problem 
remains imprecise terminology, as the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) continues to point out. 
 
US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott applauded Vike-Freiberga's action, 
and reassured Latvia that the OSCE recommendations would not be never-
ending. "...[T]he United States, while supporting the OSCE standards with 
respect to all of the member states of the OSCE, will also make sure not to 
permit the goal posts to be moved in some way that will be unfair or 
disadvantageous to a worthy democracy which aspires, as all of these states do, 
to full membership in all of the institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community," he 
said during a meeting of the US-Baltic Partnership Commission in Washington, 
DC. (US Department of State, DEPARTMENT BRIEFING, 16 Jul 99; Federal 
News Service, via nexis)  
 
The OSCE was not the only member of the international community interested in 
the Saeima vote on the language law. The Latvian representative to the Council 
of Europe (CE) Parliamentary Assembly, Juris Sinka, met with CE Secretary-
General Daniel Tarschys to discuss the bill before the vote. Sinka characterized 
the talks as "pointless and useless." "It is always fruitful to talk, but sometimes it 
is less fruitful," Sinka said. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 25 
Jun 99)  
 
After the Saeima passed the law in the third reading, Tarschys note that the 
adopted law "is not in line with Latvia's international commitments, particularly 
the European Convention on Human Rights which recognizes the freedom of 
expression and association and the right to privacy," Tarschys explained. (Baltic 
News Service DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 9 Jul 99) CE Parliamentary 
Assembly Chairman Lord Russel-Johnston remarked on his view that the law 
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infringes on the personal (not "human" or "political") rights of a major portion of 
the country's population. Shortly thereafter, OSCE High Commissioner for 
National Minorities Max van der Stoel also objected formally to the law, 
reiterating his concern that imprecise definitions could lead to misinterpretations. 
(Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 13 Jul 99) The chairman of 
the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Ole Espersen, also sent a letter voicing 
opposition. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 14 Jul 99) Not all 
of the concern emanated from without Latvia's borders, moreover. The State 
Human Rights Office repeated the concerns of others, viewing the law as 
inadequately drafted with badly defined terms and guidelines. 
 
If international organizations held the stick, however, the United States offered 
the carrot. The US weighed in after the fact, praising Vike-Freiberga's decision in 
the face of the Saeima's resounding vote for the bill. "The US Government 
applauds President Vike-Freiberga's courage and foresight in returning the 
language law to the parliament for revision," State Department spokesman 
James Rubin said. "The US Government does not, and will not, ask for changes 
in the law that go beyond the OSCE's recommendations, and will not support any 
demands in excess of those recommendations." (US Department of State, 
PRESS STATEMENT by James P. Rubin, 15 Jul 99; via 
http://secretary.state.gov/www.briefings/statements) 
 
Support for fluency expectations came from a completely unexpected source. "I 
understand -- and this is an indisputable fact -- that our Russian people who 
intend to live in Latvia should know Latvian. How can one live in a country 
without knowing its language?," said Russian Duma Chairman Gennady 
Seleznev. (INTERFAX, 1021 GMT, 13 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0713, via World 
News Connection) His compatriot, Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, did not 
agree. Stepashin railed against the Latvian parliament's passage of its language 
bill. The Latvians were ungrateful for Russia having liberated Latvia from the 
Nazis and constructed modern industry there, he said. Russia and the foreign 
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ministry should react more sharply to discrimination against their compatriots, he 
added. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 10 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0713, via World 
News Connection) 
 
Meanwhile, some Russian speakers within Latvia received a clearer picture of 
where they stood -- a little clearer, anyway. Understandably concerned with how 
the discussions were proceeding, members of the Russian Community in Latvia 
began to backpedal their earlier demand that Russia be recognized as the 
second state language in the country. Spokesman for the community's council, 
Garolds Astakhovs, said the Russian Community in Latvia would withdraw its 
demand if the Saeima allows the free and unpunished use of Russian in the 
educational, cultural, scientific, information, business, and documentation 
spheres where they do not relate to state legislative documents. (RADIO RIGA 
NETWORK, 0900 GMT, 23 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0723, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Resolution of this issue will not come quickly. Vike-Freiberga asked the MPs not 
to rush with revision of the language law, but rather to evaluate it carefully. She 
suggested that the law should emphasize the country's wish to integrate non-
Latvians into society and create an environment friendly to foreign investors while 
at the same time understanding that Latvian is the state language and should be 
respected. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 15 Jul 99) Newly 
chosen Prime Minister Andris Skele responded positively, and the law will be 
discussed in the autumn session, which begins on 26 August. 
 
Stronger government coalition formed 
Negotiations to form a new government under People's Party leader Andris Skele 
brought a quick end to a political coalition that had formed over the much-
discussed language law, to no one's surprise. What had been surprising was that 
the parties had managed to agree at all. Skele's attempts to build a workable 
government did hit a snag, though, when Latvia's Way made it clear it could not 
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work with the Social Democrats. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1500 
GMT, 10 Jul 99) Ironically, a similar declaration by Skele after the fall 1998 
elections brought the Kristopans government to power, despite the election 
results strongly favoring Skele's party. (See discussion in The NIS Observed, 14 
Jul 99.) Three parties with a combined total of 62 votes in the 100-member 
parliament -- the People's Party, Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK and Latvia's 
Way -- did manage to form a government, and split Cabinet posts equally among 
themselves. The plan, according to Skele, is to initiate an aggressive series of 
reforms to tackle the economic crisis, an ambitious aim since this year's crisis 
was in large part due to external factors, such as Russia's economic collapse. 
(AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 0752 GMT, 16 Jul 99; via nexis) 
 
ESTONIA 
Estonia is no role model, CE representative warns 
Latvia was not the only country receiving negative international attention. The 
director of the Council of Europe mission in Latvia, Gunter Weiss, said Estonia's 
passage of a restrictive language law should not serve as a role model for Latvia. 
The European Union had made similar rebukes to Estonia in the past as it 
recently made to Latvia. "I don't think it would be wise to repeat in Latvia what 
Estonia has done before. Estonia may soon run into difficulty because of that 
law," Weiss said. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 7 Jul 99) 
The Estonian law mandates that persons working in the service sector must be 
able to communicate with clients in Estonian. While the amendments have 
earned sharp criticism from Russia and from the OSCE High Commissioner for 
National Minorities, Estonian Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves reassured 
reporters that the "implementation act of the Estonian language law is in full 
conformity with the demands of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe." Moreover, Ilves said, there was no contradiction between the 
amendments and international norms and principles. (Baltic News Service DAILY 
REPORT, 1300 GMT, 14 Jul 99) The government adopted the implementation 
plan on 27 July. 
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While language restrictions are tightening, requirements for residence permits 
will be eased this fall, after the government decided to drop immigration quotas in 
the consideration of permit applications. Earlier restrictions disallowed the 
granting of permits to persons from other countries in excess of .05 percent of 
those countries' populations. Beginning 1 October, such quotas will not be 
applied in the processing of residence permit applications for stateless persons 
who settled in Estonia before 1 July 1990 and who have not left the country 
since. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 20 Jul 99) 
 
LITHUANIA 
Protest hinders but does not halt beginning of Butinge business 
In response to a protest by several members of the Latvian Greens party who 
chained themselves to a buoy at the Butinge oil terminal, Lithuania has tightened 
control of its borders. "Vessels of coast guard and navy are patrolling the sea 
border [between Latvia and Lithuania] twenty-four fours a day according to a 
fixed schedule," said Sigitas Cerneckis, director of the Lithuanian Coast Guards' 
Border Police. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 22 Jul 99) The 
protest slowed but did not stop the loading of the first shipment of oil through the 
terminal. The shipment, purchased by British Petroleum and exported by the 
Russian company Jukos, was headed to a BP refinery in Holland. (Baltic News 
Service DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 21 Jul 99) 
 
Lithuania's agreement with the US-based Williams Company has been delayed, 
causing Russian petroleum concern LUKoil to renew its campaign for inclusion in 
the Lithuanian oil industry. While the date of the agreement signing continues to 
be pushed back (now to mid-August), Russia once again is reminding Lithuania 
that other offers are on the table. The president of LUKoil's investment company 
Nikoil, Nikolai Tsvetkov, suggested connecting Russia's oil fields to the 
Lithuanian petroleum company, thereby providing "good business for both sides." 
For 33 percent of stock in Mazeikiai Oil, Tsvetkov said, LUKoil could provide "up 
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to 6 million tons of petroleum per year." (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 
1000 GMT, 22 Jul 99) This is a repetition of Nikoil's earlier proposal (Baltic News 
Service DAILY REPORT, 1400 GMT, 22 Jan 99) which was not considered while 
negotiations with Williams were going at full speed. When the offer was not 
accepted earlier this year, supplies to the refinery were halted. Konstantin Mozel, 
Russia's ambassador to Lithuania, hailed his host country's current willingness to 
listen to Russian offers and offered reassurance: The "ideology of the Russian 
offer is honesty, partnership and mutual benefit," Mozel explained. (Baltic News 
Service DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 22 Jul 99) Just in case there was any 
doubt. 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 1999 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol4/ed0412.html. 
